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Although the conventional R&D-patents relationship is a long stand and relatively undisputed 
issue within the innovation literature, the reverse causality, in particular, the potential for a 
negative impact of patents over R&D has only recently received wide attention boosting 
interesting (mainly) theoretical debates. The macroeconomic perspective on this issue, 
however, remains largely unexplored. In fact, no evidence exists that ruled out the possibility 
of asymmetric effects of patents on R&D in accordance to the level of GDP in general, and to 
‘convergence clubs’ in particular. Using panel data estimation methods on a sample of 88 
countries, over an eight-year period (1996-2003), and controlling for clubs of convergence to 
account for differences on countries’ stages of economic development, we found mix support 
to the negativity of patent on R&D investment. The accumulated patents positively impact on 
R&D intensity for the set of less developed countries whereas no statistically significant 
effect emerges in the case of higher developed converge clubs; restricting the highest 
developed convergence club down to countries with a R&D intensity above 3%, the 
negativity reverse causality arises, corroborating the asymmetric impact of patents on R&D 
investment. We further demonstrate that albeit causality appears to be stronger in the most 
intuitive appealing traditional direction, evidence supports the theoretical conveyed double 
causality between R&D and Patent. 
Keywords: Patents; R&D; panel data; convergence clubs 
JEL-codes: O31, O34 
  1 1. Introduction  
R&D efforts are generally accepted as the driving force of innovation and ultimately, 
economic growth (Baudry and Dumont, 2006). Knowledge creation and innovation are 
essential for technological frontier countries to sustain economic growth. For catching-up 
countries, its importance is also high even though these may hinge its economic growth on the 
knowledge transferred from technological leaders. This is extensive to developing countries, 
though the lack of technologic capabilities may result in lack of technological absorption 
skills and may turn not viable the technology transfer.  
Patents are commonly used as a measure of innovation, constituting an intermediate output 
(Kleinknecht et al., 2002) of R&D efforts. R&D investment on the other hand is usually 
regarded as the input to the innovative process (Beneito, 2006). Thus, in functional terms, 
R&D would be the independent variable (input), whereas Patents would be the dependent 
(output) one (Baudry and Dumont, 2006). In this sense, causality's direction implies that more 
investment in R&D would lead to more Patents being applied and issued. The estimation and 
analysis of such relationship allows us to derive productivity measures, important to analyze 
the evolution of R&D's efficiency (Messinis, 2005). It is interesting to highlight here that fact 
that one of the major EU weaknesses' in relation to the US is often associated with its inferior 
innovative capacity, somewhat explained by the lower level of investment in R&D (Baudry 
and Dumont, 2006).  
Traditionally therefore, the argument put forward to sustain the need for an intellectual 
property protective system regards the intrinsic non-rival characteristic of knowledge. The 
works of Arrow (1962), Nordhaus (1969) or Romer (1990) acknowledge this characteristic 
concluding that in absence of such a system, there would be no private incentive to pursue 
costly R&D activities. In this set, Patents function as the ex-ante incentive, granting 
monopoly rents in case of successful knowledge production (Encaoua et al., 2006). However, 
economics is truly the science of trade-offs and as always, introducing a patent system as its 
perks. On one hand, if patent rights granted are weak, the rents appropriable in the future from 
an innovation are minor and thus R&D investment may be under-supplied (Sakakibara and 
Branstetter, 2001, Varsakelis, 2001). Furthermore, the spillover effects are not also paid to the 
innovator. The sub-optimal rewarding leads to sub-optimal R&D investment, sub-optimal 
technological progress rate and consequently a smaller economic growth rate. However, 
conceiving generous benefits to a patent holder does not ensure by itself a higher 
  2 technological progress rhythm (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998, Encaoua et al., 2006). However, 
on the other hand, besides the increase in static deadweight losses resulting from the 
monopoly power inefficient pricing, follow-on inventors may face technological blockades in 
accessing general knowledge due to excessive protection and this may stall the innovative 
process (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998, Bessen and Maskin (2002), Gallini, 2002, Encaoua et 
al., 2006). This is a particularly pertinent issue when it comes to technologies characterized 
by a cumulative and sequential innovative path (Shapiro, 2001, Bessen and Maskin (2002), 
Galini, 2002, Hunt, 2006). Thus patents present themselves as a second best solution 
(Encaoua et al., 2006), with tricky effects on the expected innovative output stimulus. 
In terms of the Patent-R&D relationship, traditionally patents are perceived as the outcome of 
R&D investment. Since innovation, here measured by patent counts, tends to be crucial to 
sustain continuous increases in productivity (Romer, 1990) and hence, economic growth 
(Romer, 1990), the analysis of this direction of causality is highly pertinent. In this context, 
several authors (e.g. Griliches, 1990; Kortum, 1993; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004) have 
tried to devise a knowledge production function or a productivity evolution analysis using 
patents as output and R&D expenditures or the number of researchers as input. The evidence 
obtained in some of these studies, namely that of Lanjouw and Schankerman's (2004), points 
to a decrease in R&D productivity raising the spectra of economic growth slowdown and 
eventual halt. 
However, the prefiguration of patents as a policy instrument imposes an opposite (reverse) 
direction causality. In fact, if we perceive patents as a policy instrument aimed at fostering 
and stimulating R&D investment (Encaoua et al., 2006) and, hopefully, innovation, analyzing 
causality in this reverse direction appears to be of utmost importance. This tends to be also 
critically given the tendency, observed in the last few decades, towards reinforcing patent's 
protection rights. During the 90s, a patent upsurge has been observed, probably due to the 
reinforcing of patent enforcement and legal coverage. Still, it has also been stressed that this 
does not necessarily mean more innovation or even invention (Merges and Nelson, 1990). 
This evolution might be linked to strategic reasons to patenting (Shapiro, 2001, Hunt, 2006, 
Bessen and Hunt, 2007) and some authors even uphold that this tendency to extend patent 
protections may be counterproductive in terms of R&D and consequently innovation (e.g. 
Shapiro, 2001, Hunt, 2006, Bessen and Hunt, 2007).  
Most of the empirical studies that have tried to assess the different aspects of the relationship 
between R&D and Patents do it at firm level. The works of Pakes and Griliches (1980), 
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these studies. Common to all of these studies is the positive signal relationship estimated 
between R&D efforts and patents. Being this the direction of the patent-R&D relationship 
most commonly addressed, studies tend to uphold that increasing patent’s protection and 
easiness to obtain would guarantee higher return on R&D investment and thus increase the 
investment on knowledge production. However, the reverse causality issue is very pertinent 
since addresses how changes in patent’s scope or the simple accumulation of patents 
influence R&D. Although the literature that departs from this standpoint is scarcer, it usually 
points to an equally positive signal relationship between extending patents’ rights or its 
easiness to obtain and R&D investment. In contrast, O’Donoghue (1998) and Hall and 
Ziedonis (2001) have found evidence of a negative correlation between patent’s scope and 
R&D. 
The majority of studies analysing R&D-Patents reverse causality (e.g., Kortum and Lerner, 
1999; O’Donoghue, 1998; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Sakakibara and Branstetter, 2001) 
explains the positive or negative correlation based on a microeconomic analysis of 
revenue/cost at the firm level. As referred earlier, despite literature on reverse causality 
direction is scarce the macroeconomic perspective is even more unexplored. 
Thus, this paper’s contribution lies on the empirical macroeconomic analysis of the patent-
R&D relationship in both causality directions seeking to determine whether in a cross-country 
analysis there is evidence of the potential negative effect of patent over R&D. 
Using panel data econometric analysis techniques and a sample of 88 countries for a 8 years-
period (1996-2003), we intend to answer this central question as well as shed additional light 
on related questions, in particular, in what concerns evaluating in which direction is the 
causality stronger and/or whether the signal varies according to countries’ stage of economic 
and or technological development and how. For this latter aspect, we use Castellaci’s clubs of 
convergence. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section surveys the literature on the relation 
between R&D and Patenting. Afterwards (Section 3), we assess for a panel data of 88 
countries over 1996-2003 period whether the negativity of patents on R&D emerges at a 
macroeconomic level and which direction of the relation R&D-Patents is stronger, the 
traditional (R&D Æ Patents) or the reverse causality (Patents Æ R&D). Finally, Section 4 
concludes.  
  4 2. On the relation between R&D and Patenting. A survey 
2.1. The traditional direction of causality: R&D ÆPatents
Most theoretical (e.g. Jaffe, 1986; Griliches, 1990) and empirical (e.g. Pakes and Griliches, 
1980; Hall et al., 1986; Griliches, 1988) literature on the patent-R&D relationship tends to 
assume causality in the direction that more investment in R&D will result in more patenting. 
This is the direction in which patent-R&D relationship is usually addressed (Beneito, 2006). 
Accordingly, in the production of knowledge, R&D effort, commonly measured by 
expenditures, accumulated capital (Beneito, 2006) or number of scientists and engineers 
(Scherer, 1965) is the main input to researching new base knowledge and the development of 
new technological solutions leading to innovation. Therefore, patents can be perceived as the 
natural intermediate output of inventive activity (Pakes and Griliches, 1980). Being perhaps 
the most intuitively appealing way of considering this issue, it is also important to stress that 
theory conceives this relationship as being a positive one. In other words, devoting more 
resources to R&D would result in more patenting and in more innovations.  
Several empirical studies have tried to assess the different aspects of this relationship, 
especially at firm level. The works of Pakes and Griliches (1980), Bound et al. (1982), 
Hausman et al. (1984), Hall et al. (1986) constitute some examples of these studies. Common 
to all of these studies is the positive signal relationship estimated between R&D efforts and 
patents.  
Pakes and Griliches (1980) analyzed 121 large US companies and concluded that there is a 
strong positive correlation between the two variables in analysis though this correlation is 
stronger in cross-sectional analysis than in within firm analysis. In fact, an interesting result is 
that R&D efforts seem to follow a random walk which may reinforce the argument for 
causality. Another aspect worthy of note is the lag between R&D efforts (input) and patents 
(output). Intuition may lead to think that producing knowledge and being successful in order 
to be issued a patent requires time. Hall et al. (1986) tried to econometrically evaluate the 
existence of lags in the R&D-patent relationship using a sample of 642 US companies. Their 
results were somewhat surprising since the strongest correlation estimated is 
contemporaneous. In fact, though there are statistically significant lags of R&D efforts to 
patents, the estimated impacts are small. Though the authors simply report their findings, if 
the above mentioned random walk pattern of R&D is verified, this may help explain these 
results.  
  5 Hall et al. (1986) also built a patent production function using R&D efforts as their input and 
reported a proportional relationship between the number of patents attributed and the amount 
invested in R&D. It seems that this relationship could be characterized by constant returns to 
scale. However, some studies like Bound et al. (1982) argue that there may be decreasing 
returns to scale in this relationship. Using data on 2600 companies, Bound et al. (1982) 
confirm the existence of a positive correlation between R&D and patents but have noted that 
smaller firms and R&D programmes result in more patents per dollar invested. This raises the 
question of propensity to patent and productivity of R&D, which, although interesting, is 
beyond the (necessarily) narrow scope of the present work. 
This relationship can be extended to analyze the market value of a firm. Using R&D efforts 
and patents as inputs, Jaffe et al. (2005) tried to relate the innovative capability of firms to 
their economic value. The results point again to a positive relationship, far from surprising 
taking into account economic theory. Beneito (2006) uses the R&D-patent relationship to 
study differences in performance and innovative output of R&D programs conducted in-house 
and subcontracted.  
There are also other subjects besides R&D-patents literature where implicitly or explicitly it is 
assumed patents to be an output of R&D. For instance, in the Endogenous Growth Literature 
(e.g. Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1997) theoretical 
models are built over an imperfect competition framework based on patents. Patents are the 
key element in assuring return to private R&D investment. The allocation of resources to 
R&D activities leads to the production of knowledge which is then patented.  
The debate around Schmookler’s (1966) Demand Pull Hypothesis and Schumpeter’s (1942) 
Technology Push is another field where the causality between patents and R&D in presumed 
in the “traditional” direction. This discussion tries to assess if innovation is mainly driven by 
demand or technology though both streams use patents to measure innovation and R&D 
efforts as the input. Ultimately, the purpose is to understand whether innovative efforts are 
channeled to anticipate or respond to a market’s stimulus or R&D efforts conduce to new 
technological knowledge, unrelated to market considerations, and which determine the 
direction of innovations. Either way, the assumption on the relationship patents-R&D is that 
more R&D leads to more patenting, again postulating a positive correlation. 
An area of growing interest concerns R&D productivity. Again, when analysing R&D 
productivity, most authors (e.g. Griliches, 1988; Kortum, 1993; Porter and Stern, 2000; 
  6 Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004) use (in spite of its shortcomings) patents to measure 
innovative output and evaluate the evolution of R&D productivity, based either on R&D 
investment (e.g. Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004) or R&D capital (e.g. Evenson, 1993). The 
path of investigation on this subject lead to important results, namely concerning the 
possibility of technological exhaustion (Evenson, 1993) and it is likely to constitute a more 
accurate measure of innovative output other than the traditional patents count. Lanjouw and 
Schankerman (2004) is an example of a study where the authors tried to develop a composite 
index to evaluate patents regarding not only its quantitative aspect but also a qualitative 
approach, conducing to a composite index. 
Beneito (2006) studies the innovative performance differences deriving from R&D according 
to its place of execution, in-house or contracted. It is based on the traditional approach that 
regards patents as output to R&D. Applying an econometric panel data solution to analyse a 
dataset of Spanish manufacturing firms for the period 1990–1996, the results point to a 
overwhelming majority of the most significant innovations being developed in-house and 
contracted R&D’s goal, when used, is set on a more incremental type of innovation. 
Table 1 briefly synthesizes some of the investigation areas that use patents-R&D relationship 
in the traditional direction and assume a positive correlation, that is, more R&D investment 
leads to more patents. From the table and the former descriptive analysis, an undisputed 
conclusion can be retrieved. There are many areas of investigation conveying the causality 
between patents and R&D assuming that more allocation of resources to R&D would 
definitely result into more innovative output as measured by patents issued. Furthermore, an 
important aspect also common to all the articles reviewed is the fact that both theoretical and 
empirical works support the idea of a positive relationship between R&D effort and patents, 
with strong correlations and surprisingly a contemporaneous pattern. 
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Patents as 
R&D’s output 
Main subject area  Mechanism  Authors (e. g.) 
Endogenous Growth Theory 
Patenting is the result of 
successful production of valuable 
knowledge which, in turn, is a 
direct function of R&D efforts. 
Romer (1990); Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1997); 
Aghion and Howitt (1992) 
Patents & R&D relationship 
Patents are the natural 
intermediate output of R&D; 
R&D expenditures or capital 
constitute the main input to the 
patent production function. 
Pakes and Griliches 
(1980); Bound et al. 
(1982); Hausman et al. 
(1984); Hall et al. (1986); 
Griliches (1986); Griliches 
(1990); Griliches (1994); 
Ernst (1998); Acs et al. 
(2002) 
Demand Pull vs Technology Push 
Patents are considered 






Patenting is the result of 
successful production of valuable 
knowledge which, in turn, is a 
direct function of R&D efforts. 
Jaffe (1986) 
R&D, Patents and Market value 
Associate Tobin’s q and other 
measures of market value to R&D 
efforts and success (patents 
granted) of a firm. 
Jaffe et al. (2005) 
R&D Productivity/Technological 
Exhaustion 
Patents are the natural 
intermediate output of R&D; 
R&D expenditures or capital 
constitute the main input to the 
patent production function. 
Griliches (1988); Kortum 
(1993); Porter and Stern 




Differences in innovative capacity: 
cross-country analysis 
Patents are the natural 
intermediate output of R&D; 
R&D expenditures or capital 
constitute the main input to the 
patent production function. 
Porter et al. (2002); 
Baudry and Dumont 
(2006) 
Implicit R&D  Productivity 
Patents are a proxy to innovative 
output resulting from R&D. A 
worrying but maybe illusionary 
productivity slowdown is 
observed. 
Evenson (1993); Lanjouw 
et al. (1998) 
 
2.2. The reverse causality approach: Patents → R&D 
This section’s analysis tries to shed light on the impact patents can, potentially, have on R&D 
investment. The public good characteristics of knowledge could refrain private investment 
from R&D activities since the appropriability of the knowledge produced was not guarantied 
and with it the economic return (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Hence, unless the 
government takes on the burden of all R&D expenditures, there would be no inventive 
activity in the economy (Romer, 1990). Here lies the justification for the existence of a patent 
  8 system to assure at least a partial return to private R&D efforts (OECD, 1997). 
Notwithstanding, the definition of the extent of protection of a patent involves a trade-off 
between static losses due to monopoly power and dynamic gains resulting from innovative 
output and its wide recognition as the engine of productivity and long run economic growth 
(Romer, 1990; Gancia and Zilliboti, 2005).
1 However, the monopoly static losses resulting 
from a patent are expectedly exceeded by the spillovers from new knowledge or technology 
developed. 
One may analyse the R&D-patent relationship through two subtly different approaches, both 
in the reverse causality direction. On one hand, one can assess the impact of legal changes on 
the extent of patents rights and analyse the theoretical and empirical impact on R&D effort, 
and, on the other, one can directly study the impact of patent accumulation on R&D. 
Nordhaus’ (1969) model devised a theoretical positive relationship between stronger patent 
rights and investment in R&D. The underline intuition is simple. The extent of patent rights 
has direct implications over the expected return on an innovation. Stronger patents would lead 
to the accrue of more revenues and this would create an additional incentive to invest in 
R&D. Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990) have built analysis’ frameworks 
which lead to the same conclusion of Nordhaus (1969).  
Considering a patent race scenario, Denicolo (1996) formally derived a solution that 
reinforces the general theoretical presumption that broader patent scope or greater patent 
length will induce more R&D effort and innovation. Hence, theoretical literature on the 
reverse causality is almost unanimous in assuming a positive correlation (Sakakibara and 
Branstetter, 2001), which the conventional model predicted to be monotonic. However, it is 
important to stress that these results were derived considering an isolated invention, 
disregarding completely the cumulative nature of innovation. Jaffe (2000) stresses the fact 
that analyzing the impact of changing patents’ scope and assessing its effect on R&D and 
innovation requires distinguishing among different types of innovations. In particular, we 
should distinguish between independent inventions, cumulative inventions and research tools. 
The theoretical results of the models depend on these considerations. Nordhaus’ framework 
and the studies of Klemperer (1990) and Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) were conceived based on 
the assumption of isolated or independent inventions thus leading to an undisputed conclusion 
that broadening patents’ scope must induce more R&D investment, stimulated by the higher 
expected return from stronger intellectual property rights. The traditional wisdom, however, 
                                                           
1 This is the view of endogenous growth theory literature. 
  9 which upholds the strengthening of patents to stimulate R&D may lead to inaccurate 
conclusions when considering inventions across different scientific fields (Bessen and Maskin 
(2002), Galini, 2002, Hunt, 2006). If one conceives knowledge production and innovative 
output as a natural outcome of a cumulative process, then not only strengthening patents can 
have a surprising depressing effect over R&D investment but can also raise a new set of 
questions.  
Kitch (1977) analyses the issue on coordination among different researchers working in 
related fields of technology, namely the duplication of R&D efforts and overinvestment 
derived from patent races. The discoveries of new technological solutions could process at a 
pace above what would be socially optimal. If this is the case, one would have overinvestment 
in R&D and innovations would be replaced before achieving its maximum return. In other 
words one would have an ‘overdose’ of innovations, constraining each other’s return. Kitch 
(1977) argues that only the pioneer investment should be granted broad patent rights. 
O’Donoghue (1998) supports this insight which intuitively can be explained using the famous 
metaphor “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants”. What is being recognized here is that 
knowledge is produced in a cumulative process thus the pioneer inventor provides the 
shoulders for many others to stand on. The intuition is that stimulating the development of a 
larger magnitude innovation will produce positive externalities for inventors to come (Jaffe, 
2000). In this vein, pioneer innovator is under rewarded and investment in R&D is below 
socially desirable, laying the theoretical ground for supporting the broadening of patents’ 
scope. However, this analysis suggests that afterwards one should restrict patents. The flip 
side of the coin is that, ultimately, only the pioneer would be interest in developing 
technology based on his prior novelty. This presents a serious constraint on innovation and 
technological evolution.   
Notwithstanding, Kitch’s (1977) conclusion that it would be beneficial to extend patent’s 
scope granted to a pioneer and restrict downstream patenting, it appears more sustainable, in 
presence of a cumulative process of innovation, that extending patent scope might produce a 
negative effect on R&D investment and innovative activity. Gallini (2002) recognizes that in 
high tech industries, characterized by a continuous process of cumulative learning and 
innovations, it is likely that broadening patent’s breadth will lead to blockings and result in an 
innovation slowdown.  
The third type of innovative processes accounts for the special case of patented research tools. 
Research tools are a valuable lever to future invention but have no commercial value 
  10(Scotchmer, 1996). This is a special case among cumulative processes of innovation whose 
distinctive feature lies in the fact that research tools do not compete in the market place with 
products using them. In fact, research tools have no commercial market and in this sense, 
unless economic return is derived from their use as platform for other inventions, there would 
be no economic incentive for the development of these tools. Heller and Eisenberg (1998) and 
Schankerman and Scotchmer (1999) addressed this issue concluding that both the inventor of 
the research tool and the user want the downstream product to be produced. The difficulty 
arises in determining the optimal distribution of income between agents.  
Some of these more recent models (e.g., Gallini, 2002) use Nordhaus’ (1969) framework but 
introduce mechanisms to take into account this cumulative nature and assess with more 
theoretical accuracy the patent-R&D relationship. Despite the nuances introduced by 
considering different types of innovations, the general assumption of a positive correlation 
between R&D and strengthening patents is not really challenged.  
In synthesis, the mainstream of the theoretical literature that addresses the patent-R&D 
relationship in the direction of reverse causality assumes a positive correlation in spite of 
lacking corroboration by empirical studies whose conclusions tend to be unclear or in disfavor 
of the positive correlation assumption.  
Following these controversial and surprising empirical results which challenge the theoretical 
foundations of the patent system and its reinforcement, some recent studies have tried to 
devise a theoretical explanation at a microeconomic level (e.g. Hunt, 1999; Shapiro, 2001; 
Hunt, 2006) to the lack of empirical support of the positive correlation hypothesis.
2 A major 
distinctive feature of these works is that instead of focusing in patent’s scope or length, they 
use patent accumulation as a variable in analysis. Even though to some extent patent 
protection and the accumulation of patents are correlated, they allow the devising of 
complementary analysis. One innovative aspect is that these authors try to analyze the 
possibility of a negative correlation and what could explain it. 
One of these explanations (Shapiro, 2001) stresses the fact that the patent system seems to 
lead to the creation of a ‘patent thicket’, in particular, in industries characterized by 
cumulative and sequential innovations like semiconductors, software or even biotechnology. 
The ‘patent thicket’ is defined as a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights. In 
other words, in some industries the accumulation of patents on overlapping technologies 
                                                           
2 O’Donoghue (1998) and Hall and Ziedonis (2001) have found evidence of a negative correlation between 
patent’s scope and R&D. 
  11forces companies to cut through them in order to commercialize innovative but overlapping 
technologies. When innovation is a process characterized by cumulative innovation and path 
dependency, the enlarging of the patent thicket and the reinforcement of patent’s scope may 
inhibit rather than stimulate R&D and innovation. Hunt (2006) has developed an analysis 
based on a duopoly model and derives a necessary condition in order to be verified the 
positive correlation assumption between R&D intensity and patent number at firm level. The 
author concludes that three factors may lead to the non-verification of the necessary condition 
and in this way firms’ patenting activity has a negative effect on R&D intensity. Sufficient 
technological overlap in firms’ technologies making it likely to incur in complements 
problem, high tech industries and relatively cheap patents create a set in which the probability 
of a negative correlation may be found. Hunt (1999) had already pointed in the direction that 
relaxing the requirements to obtain a patent would stimulate R&D in low tech industries and 
could have a negative effect on R&D in high tech industries. 
Additionally, Shapiro (2001) identifies two problems - the ‘complements’ and the ‘hold up’ 
problems - that may explain the negative correlation. The ‘complements problem’ is inherent 
to patent issuing and theoretically offers an explanation to challenge the widespread 
presumption that facilitating patent issuing would stimulate R&D and innovation. There are 
two mechanisms by which we can infer the impact of patent accumulation and the perverse 
outcome of easing patent issuing. For innovating in industries such as semiconductors firms 
rely on previous technologies; even though the output of R&D efforts may be a completely 
new product, if built upon a technology which patent scope is wide, that implies paying the 
respective royalties, forcing in this way innovators to acquire several licenses and bear 
multiple patent burdens (Shapiro, 2001). Hence, the simple proliferation of patents is 
conducive to an increasingly higher cost associated to innovation resulting in a negative 
incentive to R&D spending. Beyond this negative effect, it is important to consider that in 
some cases the blocking may not be overcome. If it is not possible to obtain licensing of an 
essential patent, all the technological development in complementary fields is at stake. Heller 
and Eisenberg (1998) refer to this problem as the “tragedy of gatekeepers” in reference to 
excessive protection against the use of a particular resource which ultimately leads to its 
under use. In innovation, that means a slower technological progress and consequently a 
worst dynamic economic performance. 
The ‘complements problem’ may be aggravated in case of less demanding patentability 
requirements. The relaxing of the nonobviousness requirement in the US patent system 
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(2003) presents a model where he analyses the results of having low or high standards 
requirements to the issuing of a patent. Similarly to Shapiro’s (2001) analysis and Hunt’s 
(1999) predictions, under low patenting standards, Bessen (2003) concludes that firms tend to 
assemble large patent portfolios which are used to make aggressive demands leading to 
blockings and higher transaction costs. This would encourage more patenting but less R&D. 
This may serve as a justification in why firms keep on patenting despite recognizing it as a 
poor innovation protection instrument (Levin et al., 1987). In sum, weakening patentability 
criteria will reduce R&D expected return in high tech industries and therefore have a negative 
impact on R&D spending and innovation however, in industries characterized by an 
innovative rhythm substantially slower, the effect may be positive (Hunt, 1999). 
In what concerns the ‘hold up problem’ it is much like a heist! If the ‘complements problem’ 
derives from costs known upfront to obtain licenses or develop technology to use instead, the 
hold up problem occurs when a specific technology, not yet patented is used in the conception 
of a new product. In a patenting system of multiple overlapping technologies and in which 
patent applications are confidential, companies may be using technology that waits to be 
patented. If the patent is granted and the company’s product is already in large scale 
production, the owner of the patent gains bargaining power to the extent that he can demand 
too much and capture most of the companies’ profits. Thus, innovating may be a risky activity 
subject to opportunistic behaviour which feeds back a negative effect over R&D investment. 
In order to overcome these inefficiency generating problems, literature offers cross licensing 
and patent pools as two possible solutions. In short a cross license agreement consists of a 
contract in which the participants agree to license each others’ patents, avoiding blockings. A 
patent pool is a similar solution but of a wider nature. Patent pools are conceived as a package 
of essential and complementary patents provided by a third party and to which companies 
have access in exchange of a fee. Shapiro (2001) elects this as the most natural solution to the 
complements problem and the best way to prevent the perverse effect over innovative activity 
and economic growth. 
The trade-offs between static and dynamic efficiency underlying a patent issuing and in 
addition, the inefficiency and R&D disincentive that result from patent accumulation as we 
have highlighted may also be demeaned through a more flexible, almost custom made patent 
system. Making the patents and renewal fees crescent according to the length of protection 
desired will lead the inventor to acquire rights accordingly to its expected return (Scotchmer, 
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technological path, combining a mix of a patent breadth fee and introducing a buyout price, 
which amount may be also subject to a proportional fee, may help overcome some of the 
inefficiency problems through a self selection mechanism (Llobet et al., 2000, Encaoua et al., 
2006).  
A more flexible and custom made approach may turn the patent-system more incentive-
friendly, mostly in what concerns cumulative technologies such as software, biotechnologies 
and ICT. 
2.3. Identifying some gaps on the empirical literature and main hypotheses of the study 
Empirical analysis of R&D-patent relationship, in particular addressing the impact of 
changing scope degree of a patent is still relatively scarce and, to the best of our knowledge, 
restricted to firm level analysis (Jaffe, 2000; Sakakibara and Branstetter, 2001). Although this 
might provide insufficient guidance for further theoretical developments, there are some 
empirical studies which may shed some light about R&D-patent relationship in the reverse 
causality direction, namely that of Sakakibara and Branstetter’s (2001). These latter authors’ 
work is based on the theoretical frameworks of the models of Nordhaus (1969), Klemperer 
(1990), and Gilbert and Shapiro (1990). Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) hypothesize that 
the impact of an increase in the scope of patent protection should translate into higher 
expected return to R&D and thus stimulate R&D investment. Their econometric analysis on 
Japan’s patent law reform concludes that there seems to be no evidence that the strengthening 
of patent’s scope leads to an increase in R&D spending. As the authors themselves recognize, 
their results challenge the notion that broadening patent protection stimulates inventive 
activity. Despite the surprise, other studies have countered the theoretical proposition of a 
positive correlation between patent’s scope and R&D investment.  
Merges and Nelson (1990) and Jaffe (2000) are part of the scarce literature that analyses 
empirically how patent scope or length changes impact on R&D. In particular, Merges and 
Nelson (1990) concluded that the reinforcement of patent breadth brought about by the Bayh-
Dole Act in 1980 lifted barriers to technological development due to difficulties in obtaining 
cross licensing agreements and lifting patent blockades. In industries of cumulative 
interdependent inventions, the authors conclude that the strengthening of patents inhibit the 
broad development of technologies. Based on a case study approach, Merges and Nelson 
(1990) raise serious doubts onto the theoretical assumption of a positive relationship of patent 
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in basic innovations, on which further innovations will be based upon. 
Hall and Ziedonis (2001) analyse both quantitatively and qualitatively the semiconductor 
industry in the US in the period of 1979 to 1995. This period coincides with a patent law 
reform reinforcing patent’s breadth and an incredible increase in patent application. One 
might think that stronger patent rights would lead to higher investment and ultimately result in 
higher innovative output consubstantiate in an upsurge of patents. However, Hall and 
Ziedonis (2001) questioned the real effect on R&D investment and innovative output and the 
apparent patent paradox that arose. It is important to bear in mind the distinctive features of 
the semiconductor industry, namely the cumulative nature of its innovations. In fact, it 
appears that the broadening of patent protection has led companies to incur in strategic 
patenting to avoid technological blocking or hold up problems rather than induced a real 
increase in R&D spending. In other words, according to Hall and Ziedonis (2001), the 
strengthening of patent’s scope did not have a stimulant effect over R&D. These conclusions 
are supported by previous empirical studies like Kortum and Lerner (1999), which had 
pointed out that this patenting surge could not be explained by R&D spending alone, or 
Bessen and Maskin (2002) who demonstrated that R&D in information technology industries 
had fallen despite the pro-patent shift of the law.  
Complementarily, Bessen and Maskin (2002) tried to understand why industries like 
semiconductors or software have been so innovative if patents conferred very little protection. 
In fact, the semiconductor industry is an example of a sector where the traditional rationale 
behind reinforcing patent’s scope does not hold. Despite rapid imitation, Bessen and Maskin 
(2002) conclude that in industries characterized by an intense and cumulative process of 
innovation, patents can restrain innovation whereas in industries such as the chemical the 
independent character of inventions complies with standard rationale about patents and its 
effect over R&D investment.  
It is also important to distinguish results depending on whether we are considering a static 
scenario or a dynamic one. In a static world, imitation inhibits innovation and policy 
intervention should go in the direction of broadening patent’s protection. But, when 
considering a dynamic setting, firms tend to have more important incentives to innovation and 
rely on leadership and know-how to guarantee market share and economic return to R&D. 
Dynamically speaking; imposing stronger patents may constrict complementary innovation, 
and slowdown technological progress (Bessen and Maskin, 2002). 
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Evidence seems to show that in complex and cumulative technologies (e.g. semiconductors) 
patents seem to be disadvantageous (O’Donoghue, 1998; Kingston, 2001), while in industries 
with independent innovation processes (e.g. Chemical industry) or with a slower 
technological pace (e.g. Steel Industry), patents seem to foster innovation and the positive 
correlation between patents and correlation between patents and R&D appear to hold 
(Kingston, 2001).  
Lerner (2001) is one of the few cross-country analyses that tried to evaluate the impact of 
extending patent protection. He concluded that the evidence seems to point to an inverted U 
type relationship. In this sense, strengthening patents would have a positive effect on 
industries where appropriation and enforcement is higher such as chemical industry and 
increase the incentive to innovate. However, in high tech industries in which innovation 
follows a cumulative process of sequential innovation, the excessive patent protection may 
cause a decline on R&D investment and subsequently on innovative capacity.  
The other cross-country analysis is signed by Varsakelis (2001) who, based on a 50 countries 
sample and an econometric model, tested the existence of a positive correlation between 
higher patent protection and R&D spending. His results point out a very strong correlation 
between patent’s strength and R&D spending in aggregate terms. Yang and Maskus (2001) 
also argue in favour of this positive correlation, defending the implementation of a strong 
patent protection framework in order to promote R&D. 
The following table offers a synthesis of (theoretical and empirical) literature on the patent-
R&D reverse causality relationship.   17
Table 2: Empirical studies on Patent-R&D relationship 
Variable  Level of 
analysis 
Type of 
analysis  Correlation  Subject area  Mechanism  Authors (e.g.) 
Patent/R&D Relationship 
Broader scope increases expected return on R&D activities. Optimality at firm level implies a 
correspondingly higher R&D investment to seize the additional profit opportunity. 
Focus: appropriability 
Nordhaus (1969); Kitch (1977); Gilbert and 
Shapiro (1990); Klemperer (1990); 
Denicolo (1996); Mazzoleni and Nelson
1 
(1998); Jaffe (2000) 
Gallini (2002) 
R&D Spillovers 
Broader patent scope can induce more patenting and the disclosure of more information to rivals, 
allowing them to use that knowledge to develop other products. R&D investment’s return increases 
with these positive externalities. 
Focus: Spillovers from information disclosure 




Stronger patents give innovators a greater assurance and bargaining power, encouraging innovators 
to disclose and license new technologies rather then using them exclusively 
Green and Scotchmer (1995) 
Merges (1998) 
Arora and Merges (2000) 
Theoretical 
Negative Patent/R&D  Relationship 
The authors state that in industries characterized by cumulative innovation, broadening patent’s 
scope increases the risk of hold up and the transaction costs associated with the purchase of licenses. 
Cross licensing may not be achieved and innovation may face slowdowns. 
Bessen and Maskin (2002) 
Positive Patent/R&D  Relationship  Use data on patents issued and R&D spending for a sample of firms to devise econometric relations 
which are then estimated 





Negative Patent/R&D  Relationship  In cumulative systems of technology patenting can inhibit innovation through the increasing 
transaction costs incurred to acquire the necessary licenses. 
O’Donoghue (1998) 
Hall and Ziedonis (2001) 
Positive       Theoretical 
Negative      
Positive Patent/R&D  Relationship 
Patent’s protection reduce uncertainty about appropriation possibility but are also important as 
incentives since they permit appropriation of temporary technological rents and affect diffusion of 
knowledge. 
Varsakelis (2001); Lerner (2001) 
Patent’s 
scope 
Macro      
Empirical 
Negative  
If the inventor of a basic invention could appropriate the return on all subsequent innovations, 
technological progress and R&D would slowdown. Only him would be interest in developing the 
complementary technologies. 
Merges and Nelson (1990) 
Positive   
Theoretical 
Negative  Complementarity Problem: patent blocking impedes innovation in complementary technologies; 
Hold Up Problem: mine field of patents make R&D investment risky 
Heller and Eisenberg (1998); Hunt (1999); 
Shapiro (2001); Lerner and Tirole
3 (2004); 
Hunt (2006) 
Positive   
Micro 
Empirical 
Negative   
Positive    Theoretical 
Negative   





Negative      
Notes: 
1 These authors develop a set of theoretical arguments in favour of a positive correlation but stress the fact that in cumulative systems of technology the positive correlation may not be verified; 
2 Both these studies were conducted based on a a theoretical 
framework upholding a positive correlation though their results ended up being unclear or even suggesting a negative correlation; 
3 This study offers a possible solution to the negative effects of patent accumulation in cumulative innovation Technologies.3. Assessing the relationship between R&D and Patenting. A Panel Data Estimation 
3.1. Theoretical specification and main hypotheses 
Given the divergence among conventional wisdom supporting a positive correlation and the 
negative correlation upheld by Hunt (1999; 2006) and Shapiro (2001), and the unclear results 
of empirical studies, it urges to determine the macroeconomic effect of increasing patenting 
system’s protection and the emergence of a patent thicket. In other words, it is important to 
pinpoint exactly on which industries there will be a negative impact on innovation and R&D 
and on which it will be witnessed an increase in R&D investment. In a macro level of analysis 
it becomes imperative to evaluate the net effect resulting from these opposing forces and 
determine if patenting policy should be differentiated according to per capita GDP level or 
industry. 
In order to test the hypotheses underlying this paper’s main questions, our reduced-form 
theoretical specifications come as follows: 
it it it u RD Pat + + + = ηX 1 β α  
and 
it it it v Pat Accum RD + + + = φX ) ( 1 δ θ  
Where i and t stands for, respectively the country and year indexes. 
The first specification permits to test the R&D Æ Patent traditional relation, whereas the 
second aims at testing the reverse causality Patent Æ R&D relation. In the case the estimated 
values are positive, this means that R&D (Patents) would lead to more Patents (R&D). For the 





 has to 
come up negative. 
Vector X includes a set of relevant variables (countries’ structural characteristics - 
percentage of high-tech exports, percentage of R&D performed by firms, and Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) as percentage of GDP; countries’ governance environment – political 
stability, government efficiency, regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption control) that 
are likely to influence the intensity of R&D and patents propensity. In order to account for the 
effect of countries’ Club of Convergence, we estimated aggregate (containing all countries) 
and disaggregate samples corresponding to each Club of Convergence. 
  183.2. Data sources and proxies for the variables in the model 
From the World Development Indicators (WDI) 2005 CD, edited by the World Bank, we 
retrieved most the data used in the empirical exercise. We complemented this data with partial 
data from WDI 2006, UNESCO Science and Technology indicators and UNCTAD reports 
and World Bank’s Public sector governance indicators retrieved online.
3  
To gather information about patents issued we used the registry of the US Patents Office. 
Based on these sources we built a data panel comprising 88 countries and the following 
variables: Gross Expenditure on R&D (GERD) in percentage of GDP, Patent Counts per 
country and million inhabitants, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in percentage of GDP, 
percentage of the GERD performed by firms, percentage of high-tech exports on total 
manufacturing exports, country aggregation data using convergence clubs and legal system’s 
effectiveness proxies. Due to severe truncation of data concerning GERD, the analysis period 
is reduced to 8 years, comprising the period between 1996 and 2003, and 88 countries.
4 The 
overwhelming majority of countries (over 60% of the sample) perform GERD in an amount 
inferior to 1% and only a few (about 20% of the countries) are spending more than 2% of 
their GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). 
The source used for Patents is the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). We retrieved 
data on all patent types which included utility patents, design patents, plant patents, reissues, 
defensive publications, and statutory inventions registrations. In what concerns how the 
country of origin is determined, the criterion is the country residence of the first-named 
inventor. In particular, the USPTO data reports on all patents issued to each country from 
January 1st of 1977 to 31st December of 2004. With the exception of Cape Verde, Mongolia, 
Sudan, Zambia and Burkina Faso, all the other 83 countries had residents on whose behalf 
had been issued patents. For the five cases mentioned, we assume the value zero for the entire 
time frame. In addition, in order to demise from any scale effects we use as variable not 
patent counts but patent counts per million of inhabitants. In this way we minimize scale 
effects. For the total population data we used the WDI 2005. 
                                                           
3 In 
http://web.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/topics/extpublicsectorandgovernance/0,,contentMDK:20773712~menu
PK:433525~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:286305,00.html, data retrieved on the 20
th of December 
of 2006. 
4 The severe truncation of the R&Dvariable served as reference to the sampling period of the remaining variables 
and also to a prior selection of the countries to be considered. The selection criterion imposes that in order to a 
country to be selected to the sample, data should be available for at least 2 years, otherwise it would be 
impossible to fill in the missing values using linear interpolation, and the analysis of patent-R&D relationship 
would be unviable. In Almeida (2007) a detailed account of data gaps is provided, indicating the estimation 
  19Using Castellaci’s (2006) results, we identify three clubs of convergence based on their 
technological capabilities.
5 Since knowledge and technology are key elements for economic 
growth, these clubs are, in our opinion, particularly adequate to assess R&D-Patent 
relationship. Methodologically, Castellaci uses an algorithm to clusterize countries according 
to two composite factors: technological infra-structures and human capital and codified 
knowledge creation and diffusion.
6
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is one of our control variables in this estimation and its 
presence is justified since FDI may be an important source of knowledge transfer and 
stimulate innovation. Both positive and non-significant effects are theoretically justifiable 
under two different perspectives. On one hand, FDI is an important source of knowledge 
transfer from multinationals and thus this would increase the critical mass for creating 
knowledge in a country and stimulate an increase in R&D and in Patenting (thus, we would 
expect a positive signal relation). However, on the other hand, most multinationals keep there 
R&D labs in the home country externalizing only productive or service segments. In this 
sense, FDI would have no significant effect over patenting or R&D. The data used here was 
retrieved from the World Bank CD 2006 and is relative to GDP in Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP).  
R&D Performed by Firms expresses the share of the private, profit seeking sector on R&D 
execution. The data was obtained from UN Science & Technology statistics and comprises 
the whole sample in both time and sectional terms. In both directions of causality, this is a 
relevant variable to include since the commercial and innovation drive is expectedly more 
intense among firms than public R&D institutions (State Laboratories and Universities). The 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
procedures adopted and providing further details on the data as well preceding comments and a descriptive 
statistical analysis. 
5 The advantage of using convergence clubs’ is that gouping is made by identifying similar structural 
characteristics among countries. This constitutes a more dynamic approach when compared to a static grouping 
according to the GDP level at one particular point in time (Baumol, 1986). During this study we came across 
several different analyses (e.g. Quah (1996), Desdoigts (1999) or Hobijn and Franses (2000) but we eventually 
choose Castelacci’s. The reason is simple. Traditional analysis, including the ones of Quah (1996), Desdoigts 
(1999) or Hobijn and Franses (2000) are mostly based on GDP. Castellaci approach is technological. He groups 
countries in accordance to their technological characteristics which seems more pertinent to the issue we are 
analysing here. Furthermore, some of the above analyses comprise a reduced sample of countries whereas 
Castelacci’s comprises a wider set of countries which is more adequate for the type of wide range study that we 
intended to do (in Appendix we present Castelacci’s list of countries by club of convergence). 
6 Though a robust process, these data grouping techniques have some perks namely the fact that the number of 
clusters to be identified is predefined. One should previously set the number of clubs you wish the sample to be 
grouped by. The algorithm will stop as soon as countries are assigned to these different clubs, though it is 
possible to have unassigned countries if there are no significant structural similarity between these isolated cases 
and the clubs derived. Since it is not our aim in this study to describe in a very detailed way the methodology 
used by renowned authors’ like Baumol (1986) or Quah (1996, 1997), we advice the reference to original studies 
for a more detailed description. 
  20output achievement is the main goal and this might consubstantiate in more patents being 
issued. On the opposite direction perspective, firms commitment to R&D efforts may 
contribute to explaining a country’s R&D investment. In fact, it is a reality that the state 
cannot, alone, financially sustain this burden. Thus, the expected signal would be positive in 
both directions of causality. More advanced technological countries (Club=1) have a higher 
share of R&D performed by firms, whereas the intermediate convergence club (Club=2) 
occupies the intermediate position in terms of mean. The technological laggards have the 
smallest share of R&D performed by firms. 
In theory, the more innovative a country, the higher its R&D investment. The literature 
review offers a double way to perceive the causality direction between patents and R&D. In 
what concerns high technology exports, in the direction that patents are a function of R&D, a 
high technology level of exports indicates that a country is technologically developed and 
thus probably more capable of innovating and thus obtaining patents. On the reverse causality 
perspective, a productive specialization in high tech products requires a continuous R&D 
effort to sustain competitiveness. Thus, the expected signal on both directions of causality is 
positive. In average terms, the technological leader club of convergence has the highest 
proportion of high technology exports, more than the double of catching-up countries 
(Club=2) and seven fold the club grouping the technological laggards. 
The innovation process is largely dependent on the country’s governance context, namely in 
what respect to the role of the government, law enforcement and regulatory framework in 
general. Therefore a study aiming at evaluation R&D-Patent relationship at cross-country 
level should include indicators that might (even grossly) measure the country’s context in this 
regard. From Kaufmann et al. (2005: 6) we gathered five dimensions of governance: 1) 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence – measuring perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including domestic violence and terrorism; 2) Government Effectiveness – measuring the 
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies; 3) Regulatory Quality – 
measuring the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development; 4) Rule of Law – measuring 
the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
  21likelihood of crime and violence; and 5) Control of Corruption – measuring the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
Each of these dimensions analyses a specific aspect, potentially relevant to firms’ 
performance and, in particular, in terms of the relationship between patents and R&D in both 
directions of causality. In general, as we observe in the following tables more developed 
countries (i.e., those that belong to Club of Convergence 1, Club=1) are better ranked in terms 
of legal environment, political stability, corruption control, regulation, and government 
efficiency. 
3.3. Results of the estimation 
A panel dataset contains cross-sectional information for numerous observations and for 
several time periods (Greene, 2003). In our particular case, we use an unbalanced panel data 
comprising observations of 88 countries and a time frame of eight periods (1996 till 2003).
7 
The main advantage of panel data models is its flexibility in modelling differences across 
individuals (Greene, 2003) and the increase precision of estimators since, in less rigorous 
terms, they are derived based on an individual customized estimation process. 
Several tests have been devised to help choosing the adequate estimation procedure. Fixed 
Effects Model (FEM) and Random Effects Models (REM) are theoretically more appealing 
and empirically more suitable than the Pooled OLS as long as there are group specific effects 
to be accounted for.
8 A more advanced model should also include period specific effects 
where dummies are generated to provide contrast towards the base year. To test for its 
presence we must simply extend the above testing procedures to incorporate the analysis of 
the statistical significance of time effects.
9
To choose between FEM and REM in general, we use the Hausman test. The Hausman 
specification test compares the fixed versus random effects under the null hypothesis that the 
individual specific effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model (Hausman, 
                                                           
7 The panel data used is unbalanced since there are some missing values for some of the variables, namely R&D 
performed by firms. A balanced panel implies that all variables contain information for all subjects and time 
periods. 
8 The F-Test is a global significance test that captures if group dummies are relevant for the analysis. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, then there is evidence supporting the presence of group effects and thus FEM is preferable 
to Pooled OLS. In an analogous way, Lagrange Multiplier Test does the same for REM in comparison to Pooled 
OLS. 
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1978; Park, 2006). If correlated, the null hypothesis is rejected and the best choice is the 
Fixed Effects. The Random Effects would lead to obtaining biased estimators. When the 
Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis, Random Effects estimators are more 
appropriate since they lead to more efficient results (Greene, 2003). 
Although our focus is on the reverse causality relation, we estimate both the traditional (Table 
18) and the reverse causality (Tables 19 and 20) relation. We consider four distinct models: an 
aggregated one, which encompasses all the countries during the period in analysis; three 
models that comprise each of the three Clubs of Convergence considered in Castellaci (2006); 
and one model which consider highly R&D intensive countries, that is those that present an 
R&D intensity over 3%. In the case our data verifies Hunt’s (2006) recent argumentation on 
the negativity of patents on R&D, we would expect that the estimate associated with the 
patents’ coefficient, more rigorously, accumulated patents’ coefficient, emerges with a 
negative sign for high developed countries (i.e., countries belonging to Club of Convergence 
1) and/or high technology intensive countries (with R&D intensity above 3%). Estimates 
presented in the following tables are based on a panel of 88 countries and a six-year period 
(1996-2003). The models present in general a reasonable fit (in general with adjusted R
2 
above 80%). 
Results evidenced in Table 3 reflect the traditional positive relation between R&D investment 
and patents counts. As surveyed in Section 2, patents are commonly used as a measure of 
innovation, constituting an intermediate output (Kleinknecht et al., 2002) of R&D efforts. 
R&D investment on the other hand is usually regarded as the input to the innovative process 
(Beneito, 2006). Thus, in functional terms, R&D would be the independent variable (input), 
whereas Patents would be the dependent (output) one (Baudry and Dumont, 2006). In this 
sense, causality's direction implies that more investment in R&D would lead to more Patents 
being applied and issued. 
 
9 The F-test and the Lagrange Multiplier test allows to detect if there are group specific effects and thus if FEM 
or REM, respectively, are preferable to Pooled OLS. The F significance test is always suitable to test if there are 
group, time or both types of effects to be considered. Table 3: Estimation results for the traditional causality direction (dependent variable: Patent per million inhabitants) 
  All  R&D>3%  Club Convergence 1  Club Convergence 2  Club Convergence 3 
R&D (in % of the GDP)  30.44
*** 31.70
*** 30.05
*** -11.38  -10.21  -10.91  22.67
*** 25.13
*** 24.41
*** 1.02  -0.512  -0.481  0.105
  0.289
** 0.570 
R&D performed by Firms (%)    -12.98  -12.60    60.53  78.57    -112.6
** -113.2
**  -2.12  -2.23   4.70
*** 3.94
***
FDI (in % of the GDP)    -0.005
** -0.003  0.561  0.347  -0.101  -0.08    -0.01
*** -0.01
***  0.007  -0.003 
High-Tech Exports (%)    .0.162  -0.145    0.724  -0.053    -0.845
* -0.99
**  -0.007  -0.014  -0.002  -0.002 
Political stability      4.91
**    -14.28     4.42     0.440     0.065 
Government 
effectiveness 
   -16.76
***    -24.07     2.08     -0.362    0.232 
Regulatory context      8.62
***    -5.66     10.49     1.16
*    0.039 
Law enforcement      -7.67
*    -28.45    -29.16




Corruption     -2.49     25.49     -13.30     -1.26     0.064 










* - - - 
Hausman Test  
[Fixed Effects Model (FEM) vs. 
Random Effects Model (REM)] 
FEM FEM FEM FEM FEM FEM FEM FEM FEM FEM FEM FEM FEM FEM FEM 
Effects  [Group  (G);  Time  (T)]  G&T G&T G&T G&T G&T G&T G&T G&T G&T G&T G&T G&T  G  G  G 
N  (Observations)  704 582 582  40  40  40  184 184 184 432 350 350  88  48  48 
Adjusted R
2 0.973 0.973 0.976 0.968 0.968 0.970 0.973 0.974 0.974 0.957 0.975 0.976 0.402 0.544 0.570 
24  Estimation results presented in Table 3 show that the traditional causality relation 
between R&D and Patents is observed for the sample as a whole regardless the 
restrictiveness of the model chosen (see ‘All’ in the Table 3). Accordingly, a higher 
investment in R&D would lead, on average, to more patents counts. Such result holds 
for the most developed set of countries (Club of Convergence 1 – CC1) and (partially) 
for the less developed (Club of Convergence 3 – CC3, in the model without controlling 
for governance indicators), but not for highly R&D intensive countries (R&D>3%) and 
the intermediate developed countries (Club of Convergence 2 – CC2). 
The non-significance obtained for the highly R&D intensive set might be due to the 
different specialization pattern of the five countries complying with the 3% in RD 
intensity threshold. When analyzing case by case, we find that Finland, Sweden and 
Israel have a similar pattern of patent per R&D intensity whereas Iceland and Japan are 
distinct and opposite cases. Japan though presenting a R&D intensity close to the 3% 
barrier, is the country that patents more. We can speculate that Japan, being a highly 
industrialized country may have a different patenting pattern than European Nations and 
Israel where ICT’s have a higher weight in overall patents. If European firms approach 
is that ICT technologies, mainly in hardware terms, are not that patentable due to fast 
technological evolution, this may account for the relatively smaller patent output in 
spite of a considerably higher input. Such explanations might hold also in the case of 
countries belong to the CC 2, where a large heterogeneity (and larger than for the other 
sets) is observed in terms of specialization pattern. Nevertheless, for a more rigorous 
analysis it would be necessary a more in-depth study to each of the countries that 
constitute the sample.  
The percentage of the R&D that is performed by firms (by opposition to that that is 
performed by public R&D labs and universities) constitute a promoter for patents in the 
case of laggard countries (CC3) but a hampering factor in the case of the highly 
developed country set (CC1). This later result might be at a first glance surprising. The 
negative estimate for CC1 means that a higher proportion of R&D performed by firms 
would lead to a reduction in patenting. Two effects may account for this negativity. 
First, when analyzing the sample we observe that the largest part of R&D performed in 
countries composing CC1 is performed at firm level. Since this R&D has usually more 
emphasis in the D (Development) it would mean that the basic knowledge production 
(made in Universities and Governmental Laboratories) would decrease. Eventually, the 
slower expansion of knowledge basis would result in a smaller developing capability. 
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Second, patents are currently used more for strategic purposes rather than protection. As 
stated in the literature review (see Section 2), firms rate patents as a less effective 
protection element and thus, universities may have a higher propensity to patent. 
Reducing their weight would reduce patenting activity. For CC3 countries the signal is 
positive which means that a higher share of R&D conducted in firms rather than on 
public or non-profitable sectors would conduct to more patenting. In here the effect may 
be accounted for by the fact that there is no critical mass in knowledge creation and an 
increase in investment by firms would statistically result in a higher share and thus 
stimulate patenting. To a large extent, laggards are decaying countries with a very small 
R&D intensity. Thus, a higher R&D share by firms would mean a higher commitment 
and absolute investment in R&D and consequently positively influence patent grants. 
High Technology Exports are only relevant, in statistical terms, to CC1. However, the 
relationship is (surprisingly) negative. This might be explained in the case these high 
tech exports involve products that have a relatively short life cycle. The excessive 
dynamics of these products might not advice patenting. Such result however, would 
need further and more in-depth empirical analysis.  
The role of governance in explaining countries’ patent propensity during the period in 
analysis is tricky and in some aspects hard to explain. For the whole sample (‘All’), the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism (i.e., 
Political Stability) and the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development 
(Regulatory Quality) are important foster factor for patenting, whereas the quality of the 
public services (Government effectiveness) and the capacity for governments to 
implement sound policies and regulations (Rule of Law) emerges as a preventing factor 
for patenting. Interestingly, however, in laggard countries (CC3) the higher confidence 
by agents in abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence, 
the higher is these countries’ patenting propensity. In the case of intermediate developed 
countries (CC2), the regulatory quality is the only governance indicator that (positively) 
influences their patent propensity. 
 Table 4: Estimation results for the reverse causality direction (dependent variable: R&D in percentage of the GDP) 
  All  R&D>3%  Club Convergence 1  Club Convergence 2  Club Convergence 3 
Patents (per million inhabitants)  0.006
*** 0.006
*** 0.006




*** 0.001  -0.0007  -0.0006  0.228  0.268  -0.273
*











FDI (in % of the GDP)    0.0001  0.00005    -0.020  0.004    0.0007  0.002    -0.000  -0.000    -0.08
*** -0.12
***
High-Tech Exports (%)      -0.045    0.039  0.036
***  -0.003  -0.003  0.002
** 0.002
**  0.005  0.021
***
Political stability      -0.045      -0.54
***    -0.195
**    0.029      0.043 
Government 
effectiveness 
   0.114
***    0.381     0.219
**    0.005      0.489
***
Regulatory context      0.018      0.594
***    0.065     0.011      0.288
***




Corruption     -0.006      -1.03













Hausman Test  
[Fixed Effects Model (FEM) vs. 
Random Effects Model (REM)] 
FEM FEM FEM FEM REM REM REM REM REM FEM FEM FEM  REM  FEM  FEM 
Effects  [Group  (G);  Time  (T)]  G&T  G&T  G&T  G&T  G G G G G G  G&T  G&T  G  G&T  G&T 
N  (Observations)  704 582 582  40  40  40  184 184 184 432 350 350 88  48  48 
Adjusted R
2 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.846 0.926 0.969 0.931 0.952 0.956 0.938 0.937 0.937  0.848  0.894  0.921 
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Considering now the reverse causality relation between R&D and Patents, we detailed 
in Section 2 that the bulk of the literature on the reverse causality is almost unanimous 
in assuming a positive correlation (Sakakibara and Branstetter, 2001), in spite of lacking 
corroboration by empirical studies whose conclusions tend to be unclear or in disfavor 
of the positive correlation assumption. This empirical controversy has recently 
stimulated the emergence of several theoretical explanations at a microeconomic level 
(e.g. Hunt, 1999; Shapiro, 2001; Hunt, 2006) for the lack of empirical support of the 
positive correlation hypothesis. 
As we recall, the theoretical results that point to a solution reinforcing the general 
theoretical presumption that broader patent scope or greater patent length will induce 
more R&D effort and innovation (Denicolo, 1996) were derived considering an isolated 
invention, disregarding completely the cumulative nature of innovation.  
Our results (Tables 4 and 5), to some extent, capture this subtle, but critical, point. 
When we use simple patent counts (Table 4), the evidence is that a higher amount of 
patents (per million inhabitants) leads, ceteris paribus, to higher investment in R&D 
both for the aggregated (‘All’) and disaggregated (R&D>3% and CC) samples. In the 
case of considering instead accumulated patent counts (Table 5), the relation between 
Patents and R&D is positive and significant for laggard countries (CC3), non significant 
for more developed countries (CC1 and CC2), and negative for the set of countries that 
are highly developed and present very high investment rates in R&D (R&D intensity 
above 3%). 
Making the analogy with Shapiro’s (2001) arguments for industries, we might put 
forward that in this later set of countries (highly developed and technology advanced), 
the patent system might lead, to a larger extent than in other countries, to the creation of 
a ‘patent thicket’ - dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights -, in particular, 
in industries, in which these countries tend to be specialized, characterized by 
cumulative and sequential innovations like semiconductors, software or even 
biotechnology. As referred earlier, when innovation is a process characterized by 
cumulative innovation and path dependency, the enlarging of the patent thicket may 
inhibit rather than stimulate R&D and innovation (Hunt, 2006). 
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Table 5: Estimation results for the reverse causality direction (dependent variable: R&D in percentage of the GDP) 
  All  R&D>3%  Club Convergence 1  Club Convergence 2  Club Convergence 3 










*** 0.00007  0.00004  0.0001  0.00007  -0.0000  0.295
*** 0.328
***











FDI (in % of the GDP)    0.00006  0.00003    -0.012  -0.004    0.00018  0.0017    -0.0000  -0.0000    -0.05
** -0.01 
High-Tech Exports (%)    0.0008  0.0004    0.045
*** 0.019






   -0.015      -0.515
***    -0.238




   0.054      0.760
***    0.391
***    0.006     -0.193 
Regulatory 
context 
   0.051      0.518




    -0.035     -0.498    -0.265      -0.021     0.046 
Governance 
Indicators 
Corruption    -0.012      -1.563
***    -0.412








*** - 1.05  0.500
*** -0.206 -0.207  0.441
*** - - 
Hausman Test  
[Fixed Effects Model (FEM) vs. 
Random Effects Model (REM)] 
FEM  FEM  FEM  FEM  FEM  REM REM  FEM  FEM REM FEM FEM FEM FEM FEM 
Effects [Group (G); Time (T)]  G&T  G&T  G&T  G&T  G&T  G&T  G&T  G&T  G&T  G&T  G&T  G&T  G  G  G 
N  (Observations)  704  582  582  40  40  40  184  184  184 432 350 350  88  48  48 
Adjusted R
2 0.973  0.973  0.973  0.878  0.947  0.987  0.925  0.943  0.948 0.938 0.937 0.937 0.872 0.884 0.919 
 
 In general, whatever the model and the stratified sample considered, the proportion of R&D 
that is performed by firms has a positive impact on (accumulated) patents counts (per million 
inhabitants), which might in part reflect the issue of private incentives to R&D investment.  
FDI (in percentage of the GDP) does not have, in general, any significant impact on patents. 
The interestingly exception is for laggard countries (CC3), where higher amounts of FDI lead, 
ceteris paribus, to lower levels of patenting. This finding is likely to be related to the type of 
FDI these countries tend to attract, often based on activities requiring very low investment in 
R&D (Tavares and Teixeira, 2006). This issue, although beyond the necessarily strict scope of 
the present paper, would deserve further investigation. High Tech Exports, in contrast with 
FDI related variable present, in general, a positive and significant estimate – countries that 
tend to export higher shares of high tech products tend, on average, all the rest constant, to 
invest more in R&D. Nevertheless, such results only hold for stratified samples, not for the 
aggregated one. 
The context emerges as an important variable for explaining countries’ R&D intensity. In 
particular, the higher the perceptions on government effectiveness (quality of public services, 
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies) and regulatory quality (the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development), higher, on average, is the investment in R&D, particularly on the higher 
developed (CC1 and CC2) and technology advanced (R&D>3%) countries. 
4. Conclusions  
Due to the influence of popular themes like economic growth and innovation, the most natural 
and intuitive way to think of patenting is as an output of R&D. Empirical studies on this 
direction have found support to the theory both at the firm and cross-country levels. In fact, 
empirical studies are unanimous in their results, obtaining clear evidence of a positive 
correlation between higher R&D intensity and patent production. However, it should be 
stressed the fact that this causality has been tested, in the majority of cases, in a 
microeconomic approach, that is using sample of firms being scarce the studies reporting on 
cross-country analysis. Despite the absence of many macro surveys, the empirical studies 
have brought into light some important insights. Firstly, it seems that correlation is stronger in 
cross-firm analysis than within firms. This is an important result since Pakes and Griliches 
(1980) characterize R&D expenditures observed as a random walk process which may imply 
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i.e. R&D investment might not respond to patenting.  
Given this later debate, it seems imperative to evaluate the reverse causality issue. If patents 
constitute a basic institutional foundation, then it should influence R&D investment decisions. 
In particular, it has been demonstrated that Patent’s breadth and the number of patents 
influence R&D economic return and therefore R&D investment decisions. Within this 
theoretical framework, the majority of the few studies that exist predict in theory a positive 
correlation between patents and R&D but empirically the evidence is at best inconclusive 
(and scarce). Microeconomic studies often reveal a negative outcome, in particular when 
analysing industries characterized by cumulative innovative processes such as semiconductors 
in which technologies tend to overlap. In such industries, competition and imitation seems to 
actually have a positive effect on R&D investment.  
These controversial results have led to the emergence of several theoretical studies (e.g. Hunt, 
1999; Shapiro, 2001; Hunt, 2006) which account for the hypothesis of a negative effect of 
patent’s scope broadening, or the enlargement of the patent thicket, over R&D investment. 
Accordingly, making patents easier to obtain may actually cause R&D expenditures to 
decline. In this sense, raising patent costs and increasing criteria standards would stimulate 
R&D.  
In what concerns the macroeconomic analysis of the reverse causality, this issue is rather 
unexplored. In theoretical terms, it is not clear what stance that should be attributed to patent 
protection. If highly innovative sectors may be harmed by patenting, sectors like chemicals or 
pharmaceuticals rely heavily on them and they are the primary incentive to R&D, otherwise 
probably not pursued. Empirical analysis is almost inexistent, being Varsakelis (2001) and 
Lerner (2001) two exceptions. Both of these studies point to the existence of a positive 
correlation in aggregate terms. Thus, there is a need for gathering further empirical evidence 
in these matters.  
In the present paper we aimed at adding empirical macroeconomic evidence on the patent-
R&D relationship in both (traditional and reverse) causality directions trying to evaluate 
whether in a cross-country analysis there is evidence of the potential negative effect of patent 
over R&D put forward by recent debates in the area.  
Using panel data econometric analysis techniques and a sample of 88 countries for a 8 years-
period, we demonstrated that the traditional causality relation between R&D and Patents is 
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higher investment in R&D would lead, on average, to more patents counts. Such result holds 
for the most developed set of countries and (partially) for the less developed, but not for 
highly R&D intensive countries and the intermediate developed countries. The non-
significance obtained for the highly R&D intensive set could be attributed to the different 
specialization pattern of the five countries complying with the 3% in RD intensity threshold.  
Respecting the reverse causality relation, theoretical results point to a solution reinforcing the 
general theoretical presumption that broader patent scope or greater patent length will induce 
more R&D effort and innovation. However, such results were derived considering an isolated 
invention, disregarding completely the cumulative nature of innovation. Our results point that 
when we use simple patent counts, the evidence is that a higher amount of patents (per million 
inhabitants) leads, ceteris paribus, to higher investment in R&D both for the aggregated and 
disaggregated samples.  
In the case of considering instead accumulated patent counts, our results go in the line of 
Hunt’s (2006) argument. In fact, we found that the relation between Patents and R&D is 
positive and significant for laggard countries, non significant for more developed countries, 
and  negative for the set of countries that are highly developed and present very high 
investment rates in R&D (R&D intensity above 3%). In this vein, we suggest that in this later 
set of countries (highly developed and technology advanced), the patent system might lead, to 
a larger extent than in other countries, to the creation of a ‘patent thicket’, in particular, in 
industries, in which these countries tend to be specialized, characterized by cumulative and 
sequential innovations.  
Finally, concerning the strength of causality, our data indicate that the traditional sense of 
causality, evaluated in Granger terms, is stronger although the reverse causality is also 
acceptable. Summing up, although causality appears to be stronger in the most intuitive 
appealing traditional direction (R&D Æ Patents), there is evidence that supports the 
theoretical conveyed double causality between R&D and Patent (R&D Æ Patents; R&D Å 
Patents). 
It is important to stress at this stage several limitations of the present study, which 
nevertheless would constitute interesting points for further future research. A first point is the 
failure to account for the role of patent scope and length. These aspects constitute, as 
surveyed in Section 2, important issues for explaining the negativity of reverse causality 
  32relation between R&D and Patents. However, in order to proper test and evaluate such issues, 
we would need to have a richer and longer term sample. Focusing on a restrict number of 
countries and considering a longer time period would be an adequate strategy providing 
potential illuminating clues. Moreover, to re-estimate the models accounting for the different 
nature of patents - using high tech patents instead of patents as a whole – would permit to 
uncover further interesting results. This could also involve industry and cross country 
analysis. Finally, it would be interesting to stratify the samples using different taxonomies of 
clubs of convergence besides the one used here (Castellaci’s). 
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￿￿￿￿￿& ￿
’ # ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿￿￿ # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿% # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ # ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿# ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  # ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ # * # ￿
% ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿  + 0￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿
￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿￿# ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿6 , ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿9￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
" ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿￿ , ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿  ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
  ! ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ( ￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿0￿ ￿ ( 1￿ ￿ ( ￿￿￿: ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿
/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* # ￿￿# ￿￿# ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿5 ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿￿ # ￿5 # ￿5 # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿9￿ ￿ < ￿￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿+ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
" ￿ ￿ 7 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿￿ # ￿5 # ￿5 # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ( ￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* # ￿￿# ￿￿# ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ , ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿9￿ ￿ < ￿￿ ￿= ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿" ￿ ￿ 7 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
8 ￿ ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ : ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ( ￿; ￿! ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿> ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
! ￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿" ￿ ￿ 7 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* # ￿￿# ￿￿# ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿$ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿9￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ < ￿ ￿￿￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
< ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿= ￿ > ￿￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ < ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿9￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
+ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
$ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿’ # ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿# ￿$ # ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿5 # ￿’ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿6 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ? ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿% ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿
% ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿9￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ & ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ! ￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ @ ! ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿8 ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 8 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 6   ￿A 1 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ 6   ￿A / ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ! A ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ + ￿
" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿# ￿$ # ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿6 ￿ ￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
< ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿9￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿: ￿ % ￿￿ ￿9￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿
" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿# ￿$ # ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿￿ # ￿$ # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ A . ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿6 ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿# ￿$ # ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿/ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿5 # ￿’ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿9￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
9￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
B ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿/ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
B ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿( ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿5 # ￿’ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿% ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ( ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
, ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿= ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ A ￿ ￿￿￿: ￿￿ , ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ; ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿+ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿$ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿& ￿
$ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ 5 # ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
% ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿$ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿+ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ 0+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿$ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
+ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿@ ￿$ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
$ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ 5 # ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ? ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ % ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿5 # ￿’ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿￿ ￿ C ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ , 0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ C ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ @ ￿. / D 2 01 2 2 . ￿@ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ 5 # ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿: ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ C ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ " # ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿ ￿# ￿ ( ￿ ￿ 5 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿" ￿ ￿ 7 ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ 5 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ 5 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿
" ￿ ￿ 7 ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ 5 # ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ D* ￿ ￿ ! A ￿ ( ￿ ￿￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ E ￿ ￿ 0
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 8 ￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿" ￿ ￿ 7 ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿# ￿￿ # ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ F ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿G ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿@ ￿" ￿ ￿ 7 ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ D* ￿ ￿ ! A ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ # ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ # ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿" ￿ ￿ 7 ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ & ￿
; ￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ : ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿& ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿￿￿ , ￿$ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿" ￿ ￿ 7 ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ + ￿
8 ￿ ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ : ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ( ￿; ￿! ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿& ￿ ￿ ￿￿7 ￿ ￿￿￿  ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
9￿￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ # ￿ % ￿ ￿ @ ￿: ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿" ￿ ￿ 7 ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
" ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿ ￿ E ￿ 5 ￿ ￿ F ￿ ￿ G ￿ 1￿G ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ 8 ￿ ￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ : ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿> ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿" ￿ ￿ 7 ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿
" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ D( ￿ D$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ 5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ C ￿D* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿> ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿B ￿ ￿ ￿ 0￿ ￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿@ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ! A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # 5 # ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿E ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 8 ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿
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￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿